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Abstract
Becker and Fuest (forthcoming) provides a new explanation for the
important and puzzling link between limited liability and corporate
taxation. The authors argue that a corporate tax on all entrepreneurs
with limited liability is optimal when entrepreneurs can o¤set poten-
tial losses and when asymmetric information exists regarding projects
qualities. This note considers a model with slightly modied produc-
tion technology. It conrms that entrepreneursabilities to o¤set losses
and the existence of asymmetric information may a¤ect government
policy. However, it also shows that the optimal taxation policy di¤ers
from that in Becker and Fuest (forthcoming).
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1 Introduction.
Becker and Fuest (forthcoming) analyzes the link between corporate taxes
and limited liability rights of corporations. Traditional "folk" opinion is that
corporate tax is the price corporations pay for the right of limited liability.
However, there is no formal proof of this argument. Musgrave and Musgrave
(1980) and Rosen (2004) noticed that it is hard to believe in the link between
the real amount of benets corporations receive from limited liability and the
magnitude of corporate taxation.
Becker and Fuest (forthcoming) turns to asymmetric information to ad-
dress the issue. The authors present a simple model and proceed step by
step to achieve their goal. They consider an environment where entrepre-
neurs choose between risky projects, with high potential protability, and
safe projects, with minimal protability. An entrepreneurs incentive de-
pends on the nancing contracts. There are two contracts available: one
with limited liability and one with unlimited liability. The entrepreneurs
choose contracts based on a trade-o¤ between interest rates (unlimited lia-
bility contracts have a lower interest rate) and a loss in the bad state (limited
liability contracts do not imply a loss for the entrepreneur in the bad state).
Becker and Fuest argue that the equilibrium is ine¢ cient: some entrepre-
neurs use limited liability contracts and invest ine¢ ciently (overinvestment
problem). Corporate taxation reduces the incentive to overinvest and leads
to an e¢ cient equilibrium.
This note shows that in a model with slightly modied production tech-
nology (in the spirit of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Gale (1990), Hillier and
Ibrahimo (1992), and Bracoud and Hillier (2000)) both types of ine¢ ciencies
can arise (overinvestment and underinvestment) and optimal government
policy includes corporate taxes for some entrepreneurs and subsidies for oth-
ers (Sections 2 and 3).
2 The model.
Consider a set of entrepreneurs, indexed by j, with investment projects avail-
able. Projects require the same amount of external nancing equal to 1. In
the case of success a project generates a cash ow Fj and a cash ow of zero
otherwise. The probability of success is pj. There is also a risk-free invest-
ment project with cash ow I < Fj   1. The income tax rate is t. There are
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two types of nancing available for the risky project. One is a limited liability
contract (LLC). Here, an entrepreneur borrows an amount 1 from a bank.
In the case of success, the entrepreneur pays D to the bank. If the project
fails the parties have no returns. Alternatively, the entrepreneur can use an
unlimited liability contract (ULC). It is assumed that each entrepreneur has
su¢ cient collateral, equal to 1. Hence, ULC represents a risk-free debt for
the bank and thus has a face value of 1.1 An entrepreneur can o¤set losses
if the project fails (one can think, for instance, about alternative sources of
revenue which are subject to income taxation - in the case where the project
fails, these taxes can be reduced). The degree to which the losses can be
o¤set depends on i; i 2 f1; 2g, where i denotes the entrepreneurs type. If
the project fails, the entrepreneur loses 1   it. If i = 0, the entrepreneur
loses 1. A higher i means a smaller loss. Entrepreneurs belonging to class
1 have 1 = 1 and entrepreneurs from class 2 have 2 < 1. This means that
the entrepreneurs from class 1 have better opportunities to o¤set losses. Fj,
pj and i are the private information of each entrepreneur. Banks do not have
this information. Entrepreneurs and banks are risk-neutral. The model is
the same as in Becker and Fuest (forthcoming) except that the entrepreneurs
di¤er in Fj.2
3 Underinvestment and overinvestment.
The following equation separates socially e¢ cient risky projects from socially
ine¢ cient projects:
pjFj   1 = I (1)
If the left side is greater, the project is socially e¢ cient and vice versa.
For marginal entrepreneurs (marginal entrepreneurs projects satisfy (1))
@pj=@Fj =  (1 + I)=F 2j < 0 and @2pj=@F 2j = 2(1 + I)=F 3j > 0.
We have the following set of equations which determine an equilibrium.
The choice between the LLC and the risk-free project is given by:
pj(Fj  D) = I (2)
1Equity is ruled out. Thus, the results of Becker and Fuest (forthcoming) can be better
applied to rms which do not have access to equity markets or rms with a high agency
cost of equity.
2Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Gale (1990), Hillier and Ibrahimo (1992), and Bracoud and
Hillier (2000).
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where D = 1=p and p is the average probability of success among the
entrepreneurs with a LLC. For this equation we also have @pj=@Fj < 0 and
@2pj=@F
2
j > 0. If an entrepreneurs project satises (2) he is indi¤erent
between the LLC and the risk-free project. If the left side is greater, the
entrepreneur chooses the LLC and vice versa.
The choice between the LLC and the ULC is given by:
pj(Fj   1=p)(1  t) = pj(Fj   1)(1  t)  (1  pj)(1  it)
which can be rewritten as:
pj =
1  it
t  it+ (1  t)=p (3)
and the choice between the ULC and the risk-free project is given by:
pj(Fj   1)(1  t)  (1  pj)(1  it) = I(1  t) (4)
The analysis of equations (1)-(4) reveals the following. (a) From (1)
and (2) the marginal entrepreneur with pj = p is indi¤erent between the
LLC and the risk-free project. (b) From (1) and (3) marginal entrepreneurs
with pj = p and perfect loss o¤set are indi¤erent between the LLC and
the ULC because the right side of (3) is equal to p when i = 1. Marginal
entrepreneurs with pj = p and imperfect loss o¤set prefers the LLC to the
ULC. This is because the right side of (3) is greater than p since 2 < 1. (c)
Marginal entrepreneurs with perfect loss o¤set are indi¤erent between the
ULC and the risk-free project. Marginal entrepreneurs with imperfect loss
o¤set prefer the risk-free project to the ULC. To see this let us rewrite (1)
and (4) as follows:
pj = (1 + I)=Fj (5)
pj = [I(1  t) + 1  it]=[(Fj   1)(1  t) + 1  it] (6)
For class 1 entrepreneurs (i = 1) the right side of (6) equals that of (5)
and for class 2 entrepreneurs it is greater than that of (5) because Fj > 1+ I
and 0  2 < 1.
Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the equilibrium decision-making for the en-
trepreneurs of class 2 and 1 respectively. The thick lines represent equations
(1)-(4). Letters f , l and u denote the areas where the entrepreneurs choose
the risk-free contract, the limited liability contract, or the unlimited liability
contract respectively.
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Figure 1. Overinvestment and underinvestment.
Consider Figure 1a (type 2 entrepreneurs). From the remark (a) above
the point of intersection of (1) and (2) has the probability of success pj = p.
The intersection is unique since the slope of (1) is greater than that of (2):
 1+I
F 2j
=   p2
1+I
>   I
(Fj D)2 =  
p2
I
. From (b) the line corresponding to (3)
lies above the line pj = p. From (c) the line corresponding to (4) lies above
the line corresponding to (1). Finally, the lines corresponding to (2) and (6)
cross (3) at the same point (Fb; pb) where
Fb = 1=p
 + [It(1  2) + I=p(1  t)]=[1  2t]
Now consider Figure 1b (class 1 entrepreneurs). Since 1 = 1, eq. (1)
and (4) are identical. The right side of (3) equals p.
As follows from Figure 1, there are two areas of ine¢ ciency. Firms in
area A1 underinvest (only class 2) and rms in area A2 overinvest (and use
the LLC). What explains these results?
First, consider entrepreneurs with unlimited liability. Class 1 entrepre-
neurs can perfectly o¤set losses under the unlimited liability contract. This
means that the after-tax return (in the case of either success or failure) equals
the before-tax earnings/loss multiplied by (1 t). Also, the unlimited liability
contract is a risk-free debt for the bank. Thus, the entrepreneurs before-tax
expected earnings equal the projects expected earnings (pjFj) reduced by
the payment to the bank (which equals the investment cost 1). This means
that under unlimited liability, class 1 entrepreneurs will not invest in socially
ine¢ cient projects because they are always better-o¤ with the risk-free in-
vestment (eq. (1)). The same holds for class 2 entrepreneurs because they
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earn less than class 1 entrepreneurs given imperfect loss o¤set (line (4) lies
above the line (1)).
Secondly, consider entrepreneurs with limited liability. From (1) marginal
entrepreneurs have projects with equal expected values. In area A2 marginal
entrepreneurs have lower probabilities of success than p (the average prob-
ability of success among entrepreneurs with limited liability contracts). A
higher probability of default is detrimental for creditors. Thus, marginal
entrepreneurs in area A2 make a positive surplus compared to the symmet-
ric information case. This implies that there are some entrepreneurs with a
lower probability of success than marginal entrepreneurs which will choose
limited liability investment in risky projects (similar to the asset substitu-
tion e¤ect).3 On the other hand, marginal entrepreneurs in area A1 have a
higher probability of success which is benecial for creditors and harmful for
shareholders because they receive a lower return in the good state. Thus,
some entrepreneurs with a high probability of success will not invest in so-
cially e¢ cient risky projects. Optimal government policy will include a tax
on entrepreneurs with limited liability contracts and high earnings (high Fj)
and subsidies for entrepreneurs with limited or unlimited liability contracts
and low earnings (low Fj).4 This will move line (2) toward line (1) reducing
areas A1 and A2.5 A universal tax on all entrepreneurs with limited liability
is never optimal because it will move line (2) up and to the right, increasing
area A1.
The result of Becker and Fuest (forthcoming) emerges as a particular case
when Fj are equal among the entrepreneurs. Figure 2 illustrates their result.6
3DeMeza and Webb (1987).
4Mathematical calculations of the optimal tax rate and the amount of subsidies are
omitted for brevity. Note that they depend on whether the government is able to observe
(ex-post) the type of entrepreneur or only the amount of earnings.
5Also note that in Becker and Fuest (forthcoming) all entrepreneurs have su¢ cient
collateral (that makes debt risk-free for banks). It can be shown that if this assumption
is relaxed one can have an equilibrium where some entrepreneurs with unlimited liability
overinvest. Thus, optimal policy may include taxes on some entrepreneurs with unlimited
liability.
6Note that the analysis above holds regardless the distribution of entrepreneurstypes
in the economy. For example, the density of some types can be equal zero.
6
-6
a
p
pb
F  Fj
pj
pm
F1
A1
A1
A2
f
f
f
l
l
l
uu
f
-
6
b
p
F Fb
Fj
pb
pm
pj
F2F3
A1
A1
A2
f
f
f
l
l
l
uu
f
Figure 2. The case of Becker and Fuest (forthcoming).
The only possible equilibrium when the market for LLCs does not col-
lapse is when Fj = F1 > F  (Figure 2a). In such a situation there exists an
entrepreneur, with a probability of success pm < p, who is indi¤erent be-
tween the LLC and the risk-free project. From (2), the entrepreneurs prot
is increasing in pj under limited liability. Thus, entrepreneurs with pj such
that pm < pj < pb choose the LLC (as was shown above pb  p). This
case corresponds to Proposition 1 in Becker and Fuest (forthcoming). The
only possible ine¢ ciency in their paper is overinvestment (area A2). Now
suppose that an equilibrium exists where Fj < F  (Figure 2b). Consider the
case Fj = F2 > Fb. Then pm > p and the entrepreneurs with pj such that
pb > pj > pm undertake the project with the LLC. But this implies pm < p
(since p is the average probability of succes among the entrepreneurs with
the LLC) leading to a contradiction. Finally, consider the case Fj = F3 < Fb.
As one can see from Figure 2 the market for LLCs collapsed here. In equi-
librium entrepreneurs choose either the ULC or the risk-free project. 1=p
can be interpreted as the face value of o¤-equilibrium LLC o¤ered by banks
(which is too high for entrepreneurs).7
The above analysis was based on slight modicastions of the production
technology in Becker to Fuest (forthcoming). Some additional insights can
be obtained with regard to the models implicit assumptions regarding the
government. For example, if the government can determine entrepreneurs
classes then an alternative policy exists. Consider the eq. (4). Suppose the
7The last situation is not considered in Becker and Fuest (forthcoming). Here the
only ine¢ ciency is the underinvestment problem. Therefore, the optimal policy would be
subsidizing some entrepreneurs with unlimited liability.
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government subsidizes class 2 entrepreneurs if they have an unlimited lia-
bility contract and the bad state is realized. If the amount of subsidization
equals t   2t (the di¤erence between perfect loss o¤set and imperfect loss
o¤set), the decision-making would be optimal, as is easy to see from (4). The
entrepreneurs net payo¤ in the bad state would be (t   1) and the condi-
tion (4) converts to (1). Thus, the entrepreneursdecision-making will be
optimal ex-ante. The use of unlimited liability insures the rst-best outcome
in the model. There is no need for limited liability contracts. In Figure 1a
the e¤ect of such a subsidy will be to move (4) toward (1) and (3) toward
pj = p
. While the government cannot observe the quality of the projects, it
can distinguish class 1 entrepreneurs from class 2 entrepreneurs by observ-
ing (possibly ex-post) their income from other sources. If the government
cannot observe entrepreneursincomes from other sources, and thus cannot
distinguish between class 1 and 2, the rst-best outcome is never achiev-
able through subsiding entrepreneurs with unlimited liabilily alone. This is
because any subsidy will bias class 1 entrepreneurs towards overinvestment
with unlimited liability nancing. In these conditions, optimal government
policy may contain other instruments.8
To summarize, we believe that the idea in Becker and Fuest (forthcom-
ing) about the impact of di¤erent loss o¤set opportunities under asymmetric
information is interesting and must certainly be taken into consideration by
government tax authorities. However, in our opinion, the implications of this
idea are only partly explored by Becker and Fuest (forthcoming).
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